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As the only country in the MENA region to have quite successfully taken a democratic path, 
Tunisia holds much promise. Notwithstanding continuous political and economic challenges, 
Tunisia succeeded in holding several free and transparent elections and ratified a constitution in 
2014 seen by many observers as the most advanced legal text in the region. However, the country 
still faces a number of challenges most notably violent extremism. Since the eruption of the Arab 
Spring in 2011, Tunisia has been struggling with a high number of terrorist attacks. On the 18th of 
March 2015, three gunmen attacked a group of tourists at the Bardo National Museum in the capital 
Tunis. Three months later, a lone gunman attacked a group of British tourists at a beach resort in 
the city of Sousse. On the 24th of November 2016, a dozen presidential bodyguards were killed on 
a bus by a suicide bomber in downtown Tunis. All of these deadly attacks were followed by 
sporadic terrorist attacks especially in the south, near the borders with Libya. In addition, a 
significant number of foreign fighters joining the Islamic State in Syria, Libya and Iraq were 
Tunisians. (Watanabe, 2018). According to the data released by The Soufan Group in 2015, 
Tunisians constituted the single largest group of foreign fighters in Libya and Syria, with around 
6000 fighters (Soufan Group, 2015). A number of these fighters have already returned home, some 
of whom are not even known to the authorities (Watanabe, 2018).  
The convergent trends of increasing violent extremism and reinforcing democratization since the 
fall of Zine al- Abidine Ben Ali is quite a puzzle. Existing scholarship suggests that we should 
expect to see violent extremism declining while the country moves forward to more consolidated 
democracy (Macdolnald and Waggoner, 2018; Krueger, 2007). Alan Krueger, argues that 
extremists and terrorists emerge from countries where political and civil liberties are limited 
(Krueger, 2007: p 74). Puddington brings to light that 90% of terrorist attacks in 2013 took place 
in either “not free” or “partly free” countries (Puddington, 2015). However, the Tunisian case is 
quite different. Although Tunisia is classified as a free country by the Freedom House, the number 
of Tunisians joining radical groups either in Tunisia or foreign groups raises concerns. This 
background note will address this issue and attempts to answer a few questions: What are the 
violent extremist groups that Tunisians have already joined, in Tunisia and abroad? What are the 
root causes of violent extremism? What kind of strategies have the Tunisian government adopted 
to counter violent extremism?  
Violent Extremist Groups:  
Existing data shows that there are a number of violent extremist groups operating in Tunisia. In 
addition to the task of planning and executing terror attacks, these groups also work on recruiting 
Tunisians for foreign conflicts, more particularly in Libya, Syria and Iraq. Among these groups, 
ISIS has the most powerful ability to recruit Tunisians for its local and international operations. 
This is done thanks to ISIS large network, as it cooperates with local groups operating in Tunisia, 
including Ansar al- Sharia, Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade and Mujahidin of Kairouan.  
Ansar al- Sharia  
Ansar al- Sharia (AST) is a violent Islamist group that works to implement Sharia Islamic law as 
the country’s prime source of laws. In order to achieve this, Ansar al- Sharia has recourse to 
proselytizing through religious education and the provision of social services. In order to increase 
its platform for more violent jihad, the AST sought to enforce strict laws, largely based on the duty 
to command moral acts, and looks forward to carrying out more jihad by executing violent terror 
attacks. According to a number of reports, leaders of the AST pledged their allegiance to ISIS in 
2014. Since then, the AST has become the largest ISIS affiliate in Tunisia.  The number of 
Tunisians joining ISIS in Libya and Syria was so high that AST lamented that the conflicts in the 
Middle East have “emptied Tunisia of its young generations”. ISIS propaganda has remarkably 
relied on Tunisians who participated in a significant number of ISIS’ terror attacks.  
According to some reports, it seems that the cooperation between AST and ISIS started in 2014, 
when AST deputy “Emir” Kamel Zarrouk joined ISIS in Syria (Long War Journal, 2014). Since 
then, a strong relationship between ISIS and AST has been established. In 2015, ISIS released a 
video in which a Tunisian militant, known as Abu Yahia al- Tounessi threatened all Tunisians of 
war and blood, unless they join ISIS and claim allegiance to its leader Abu Bakr al- Baghdadi 
(Reuters, 2015). ISIS also released another video in 2015, in which a group of militants called 
“Tripoli Province” threatened the Tunisian government of further attacks (Counter Extremism 
Project, 2015). It would be remiss not to mention that AST had previously cooperated with al-
Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, along with other extremist groups including the Nusra Front and 
the Islamic State of Iraq. In 2014, the leader of the AST, Abu Iyad al- Tunisi released a statement 
to call for unity between all the jihadi groups and set aside any potential ideological disagreements 
(Long War Journal, 2014).  
Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade 
Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade is a militant group that claimed responsibility for a large number of attacks 
against the Tunisian army and security forces. It pledged allegiance to ISIS in 2014. Okba Ibn 
Nafaa Brigade is known to the Tunisian authorities as experienced fighters of the Islamist rebellion 
in northern Mali as well as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. Since the fall of Ben Al’s regime, 
Okba Ibn Nafaa has been continuously attacking the Tunisian army and other security forces, 
especially in the checkpoints near the Libyan and Algerian borders. Several attacks were conducted 
by Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade, including the 2015 attack on Tunisia’s Hotel Imperial Marhaba that 
ended up with around 37 casualties, and the 2014 attack on the Tunisian military forces near the 
Algerian borders. In September 2014, the Tunisian authorities disclosed Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade’s 
plan to attack the parliament during the 2014 parliamentary elections. The group’s leader, known 
as Lokmane Abou Sakhr, was killed by the Tunisian forces in 2015, after being accused of the 
attack on Bardo Museum that killed around 21 people including tourists and security forces.  
Mujahidin of Kairouan 
Mujahidin of Kairouan is a violent extremist group that pledged allegiance to ISIS in May 2015. 
The group was identified by the authorities when ISIS English magazine Dabiq released an issue 
on the activities of the group in Tunisia, along with a picture of Kairouan mosque on the cover (Al- 
Arabia, 2015; Tunisia Live, 2015).  
Tunisian Combat Group  
The Tunisian Combat Group is classified as a foreign terrorist organization by the US Department 
of State. The group was founded by Abu Iyad al- Tunisi and other commanders in al-Qaeda in 
2000. This group was primarily founded as a bridge to unite Tunisians coming back home from 
Afghanistan to work against the Tunisian government. Since its establishment, the Tunisian 
Combat Group claimed responsibility for a number of violent attacks. For instance, the TCG 
provided foreign passports to al-Qaeda combatants who killed anti-Taliban leader Ahmad Shah 
Massoud in September 2001 (New York Times, 2001). In April 2001, militants from both the TCG 
and al-Qaeda were arrests in Rome for planning an attack against the US embassy. This incident 
impelled many embassies and consulates across Europe to close their doors for two days as a 
precaution against any potential terrorist attack.  
Ansar al-Dine  
Ansar al-Dine is an affiliated group with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb. It operates mainly in 
Northern Mali and Southern Algeria. According to the latest data, Tunisians make almost 600 
combatants among the group’s members.  
Causes of radicalization in Tunisia 
Although Tunisia is experiencing a relatively successful democratic transition, the process included 
a sudden rise in the recruitment of new fighters for violent extremist groups, either in Tunisia or 
abroad. One possible explanation is that the Tunisian revolution created an unexpected mixture of 
rising social demands and declining institutional capacity. For almost half a century, Tunisians 
have been deprived of free expression, free political participation and governmental transparency. 
All the possible channels of political participation have been under the tight control of the state, 
during both Habib Bourguiba and Ben Ali’s regimes. The fall of the authoritarian regime in Tunisia 
altered the situation as it provided Tunisians with an opportunity to have high but unrealistic hopes 
for their future. Almost 7 years since the eruption of the 2011 Tunisian revolution, these hopes 
have not been met yet. The transition has been very slow as it faced a number of challenges most 
notably the economic challenges. The break between the high demands and the institutional failure 
gradually led many Tunisians with a feeling of disappointment and frustration. Bearing in mind the 
high corruption, the rising unemployment and the continuous disagreements among the Tunisian 
political parties, the feeling of despair among Tunisians has been gradually rising. Such political 
vacuum offered many violent extremist groups an excellent opportunity to represent themselves as 
the new alternative for many young Tunisians and to offer them a sense of identity and economic 
gain.  This background note discusses the causes of radicalization in Tunisia and closely examines 
the reasons which may have encouraged young Tunisians to join violent extremist groups. 
The rise of Political Islam and the identity crisis in Tunisia. 
The rise of political Islamism in Tunisia dates back to the early 1970’s, when Rached Ghannouchi 
founded Al Jamaa al Islamiya. In 1982, the group became known as Movement de La Tendence 
Islamique and later as Ennahda Movement. The dynamic nature of the movement, in form and 
structure, is the corollary of Tunisian post-colonial policies which eradicated all Islamic-based 
organizations in the name of modernity and anti-terrorism. The presidential change in 1989 did not 
bring about any change in the relationship between political Islam and the regime. In contrast, Ben 
Ali’s regime adopted more oppressive measures toward Islamists who, as a result, reacted in a more 
aggressive and violent manner. The 2011 free and transparent elections, thanks to the Jasmin 
revolution, revealed a radical change in the Tunisian political scene. With 41% of the total votes, 
Ennahda movement succeeded in winning 89 seats out of 218.  This success is open to different 
interpretations, most notably Ennahda’s ability to shift from a traditional opposition to a new ruling 
party translates its ability to effectively profit from long decades of oppression and marginalization 
under Bourguiba and Ben Ali regimes. However, and unlike the Ennahda party, all other Islamist 
groups declined the offer of the Tunisian revolution to promote and embrace democracy and thus 
moderate themselves. These groups refused to participate in the elections and rejected any 
possibility to engage in the new political landscape of Tunisia. Instead, they chose violence and 
extremism as means of political expression. The first reaction of these groups was in September 
2012, when Salafists groups attacked the US embassy in Tunis. Since then, the relationship 
between the ruling party, Ennahda Movement, and Salafist groups, particularly Ansar al-Sharia, 
has dramatically changed due to local and international pressures.  
Unemployment  
Unemployment has been a challenging issue for almost all governments since 2006. A number of 
conclusions may be drawn from chart 1. 
Feelings of despair and hopelessness are common among a large number of young Tunisians. These 
young generations find it quite challenging to have a decent life in Tunisia, as opportunities are 
few. Chart 1 highlights the evolution of unemployment in Tunisia from 2006 to 2016. First, the 
unemployment rate has never fallen under 12%. This number translates a perpetual failure to 
provide young Tunisians new economic opportunities that allow them to have a comfortable life 
and discourage them from any possibility to join violent extremist groups. The existing scholarship 
on violent extremism shows that the most frequent reasons that impel young people to turn to 
violent extremism are poor economic conditions and lack of employment opportunities. Most of 
those who joined extremists groups were no longer capable of living in a state of low self-esteem 
and a feeling of bitter uselessness. The majority of those joining violent groups are aged between 
20 and 35, many of whom are unable to find a source of income due to the lack of opportunities 
and the rising costs of living in Tunisia, especially after the 2011 revolution. 
 
Chart 1: Evolution of unemployment in Tunisia  
 
                                                                                                          Source: INS Tunisia, June 2016.  
Regional disparities  
The root of radiclaization lies in the socio-economic marginalization of all interior parts of Tunisia. 
Both Ben Ali and Bourguiba adopted a partial development mechanism, limited to a few areas such 
as such the coast and the north while leaving behind the rest of the country with no clear strategy 
for future development. The 2014 World Bank report argues that “the uprisings spread between 
marginalized communities throughout the country in what was coined socioeconomic proximity, 
rather than geographic proximity” (World Bank Group, 2014: 39). Chart 2 clearly illustrates the 
huge regional disparities in terms of employment opportunities. In urban areas, while 68% of male 
young Tunisians in the coast are employed, the rate drops to 56.6% in interior parts of the country. 
The same plight is applied to rural areas where 27.5% of female young Tunisians are employed on 
the coast and only 8.3% of the same category are employed in the south. This regional disparity 
systematically generates “Youth Migration”, a term used in the 2014 World Bank Report to 
describe the Tunisian Youth long journey looking for a job. However, such migration has rather 
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Rural areas are deprived of the young labor force, which is overfeeding poor suburbs of urban 
areas. This youth migration may, in some cases, turn into migration to Libya, Syria and Iraq to join 
ISIS and other violent extremist groups. When deprived of justice and economic opportunities, a 
large number of young Tunisians join violent extremist groups first to meet their economic needs 
and second to retaliate against the state that socially and economically excluded them from their 
own society.  
Chart 2: Employment and Regional disparities in Tunisia in 2012.  
 
Education  
The educational system in Tunisia is subject to a poor quality in form and content. Tunisian schools 
don’t provide valuable programs which target students’ life skills that support a smooth and easy 
transition from the academic environment to a professional context (World Bank group, 2012p, 
2013c). This particular issue is addressed by the Ministry of Education through the 2016 National 
Educational Reform. The Ministry discloses in an official statement that “the poor infrastructure 
and the lack of cultural and sports activities generated a feeling of resentment and irritation towards 
schools”. The quality of teachers also brings about a negative impact on the educational system. 
Teachers’ recruitment procedure is almost random, as they are directly signed up from college 
without any prior teaching training (World Bank Group, 2014: 31). Lack of guidance and support 
is another form of a poor educational system, as students are vulnerable to bad life decisions and 
wrong career choices. Tunisian schools lack expert academic advisors who have the requisite skills 
to provide advice and help students choose the right academic path and the suitable career plan. 
Jean Paul Payet argues that Tunisian schools and even universities are marked by an unsafe 
educational space (Payet, 2006, 74). He further explains this idea by enumerating the various forms 
I Mnk
I awn:
cm 1...“... Smuh cm 1...“... Smuh
Smart: Wmld amkzonzd, mu.
Nan mm rxilndns .u mm .....m m zdunnun .1. mm... prngamx
of violence to which both students and teachers are exposed, such as drugs, cheating, physical 
violence and lack of discipline. All these elements, directly and indirectly, pave the way for a new 
generation that has a fragile educational background and even vulnerable to the danger of violent 
extremism at an early age.  
One of the major issues facing education is its adjustment to the labor market. First, the 
phenomenon of leaving the school early raises issues of serious concern. According to the2014 
World Bank report, the majority of inactive youth in Tunisia hardly succeeds in obtaining a 
secondary degree. Actually, only one out of five young Tunisians completes secondary education 
in rural areas, whereas in urban areas 50.6% of males and 47.0% of females fail to obtain any 
secondary degree as indicated in figure 6. This creates generations of unskilled labor force 
incapable of meeting the needs of technical and service jobs. Second, the focus on theory reflects 
one of the many deficiencies the Tunisian educational system suffers (Euromed Resource Centre, 
2012). There is no clear orientation in the official curricula towards practicality and functionalism. 
This idea is further developed by Lahcen Achy, who argues that Tunisian education has become a 
“double-edged sword” for it raises high expectations for students who remain unemployed for long 
years (Achy, 2011). Consequently, severe social and psychological impacts are expected. 
According to the 2014 World Bank report, postgraduate unemployment generates feelings of 
frustration, irritation and even anger. They end up as dependent individuals and a burden on their 
families. 
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Corruption  
Tunisia is marked by a solid ground for “anticompetitive practices” such as corruption. It is true 
that these practices are not unfamiliar to the Tunisian context, as they have been widespread during 
Ben Ali’s era. However, they become worth noting if they increasingly coexist with an environment 
of democratic transition and a setting of transparency and trust. World Bank defines corruption as 
“the illegitimate use of public power to benefit a private interest. Corruption may include many 
activities including bribery and embezzlement. Government, or political, corruption occurs when 
an office-holder or other governmental employee acts in an official capacity for personal gain” 
(World Bank Group, 2014). This definition suggests that corruption, as it is associated with public 
activities, may limit governments’ efforts to permanently create employment and investment while 
feeding the country with more social exclusion and injustice. According to corruption perception 
index, Tunisia scored 36, which is internationally regarded as highly corrupt with “serious 
corruption problems” (Transparency International, 2015). Surprisingly, the 2015 score is much 
higher than 2010 under Ben Ali’s regime with a corruption index of 43 .The revolutionary context 
in Tunisia created paralyzed governments and weak state policies that are unable to root out 
corruption and eradicate anticompetitive practices. This has gradually led to unjust economic 
opportunities and a dramatic increase in social marginalization.  
Lack of confidence and political participation  
A democratic political system is established by the people and implemented for the people. The 
governments should use the most appropriate and effective mechanisms which express people 
demands and needs. These mechanisms are important as they reduce the gap between the 
governments and citizens and eliminate any potential clash between the ruler and the ruled. 
Accordingly, a conclusive evaluation of a democratic political system starts with an evaluation of 
citizens’ readiness to communicate with their government. Such communication takes several 
forms, including the extent to which citizens have confidence in institutions and the level of 




Chart 4: Trust in Public and Religious Institutions 
 
 
Although a strong and legitimate political system in Tunisia was established thanks to the new 
constitution and the transparent elections, a minimum level of confidence in institutions is not even 
achieved. According to a survey conducted by World Bank Group and the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and development, Tunisians don’t trust the newly established institutions, as 
indicated by chart 4. The figure reveals two points. First, there is a considerable high confidence 
in social and religious institutions such as the religious organizations and the family. Second, a 
very low trust in political institutions is easily observed. Long decades of dictatorship and 
marginalization impeded Tunisians, particularly youth, from reconstructing their trust and 
adjusting themselves in the democratic environment. Accordingly, it may take few more years to 
observe a certain degree of trust between citizens and institutions, if of courses such democratic 
opportunity is protected and promoted. Such lack of trust and confidence toward the new political 
institutions, while having high trust toward religious institutions, may directly or indirectly 
encourage young Tunisians not to recognize these institutions and join other groups that employ 
religion as a source of action. 
Although Tunisia enjoys a certain degree of democracy, with stable legitimate political institutions 
that guarantee freedom and liberties, political participation is surprisingly very low. According to 
the 2014 World Bank Report, only 17% of youth aged between 18 and 25 voted in the 2011 
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elections. The final report published by ISIE reveals even more surprising statistics. Only 156297 
voters registered in the 2014 elections, which means that only 29.16% of possible voters 
participated in the 2014 elections. These results may have some explanations. First, the lack of 
enthusiasm undoubtedly contributed to the lack of political participation. Tunisians are no longer 
interested in politics especially right after Ben Ali ouster. The diminution of the revolutionary spirit 
and the subsisting lack of confidence in political institutions created a mood of indifference and 
inactivity. Second, many Tunisians lack awareness of the importance of voting, along with a 
limited knowledge of politics, led to a poor political participation. The World Bank Group reveals 
that 15.7% of young Tunisians in rural interior areas have relatively limited knowledge of politics. 
In the urban area, only 24.2% have an ability to debate in politics. 
Poor civic engagement  
According to the 2014 World Bank report, there is a significant increase in the number of 
nongovernmental organizations from 10.000 in 2011 to 15.000 in 2014. These NGO’s are mainly 
welfare organizations targeting several issues such as poverty and exclusion in the interior regions 
of the country. However, this doesn’t translate a high civic engagement in Tunisia. In contrast, 
many Tunisians are rather inactive and indifferent. Levels of volunteering among youth are very 
low in a way that public policy toward Youth participation in civil society should be revised (World 
Bank Group, 2014). This may have several explanations. First, many young Tunisians feel that 
their voices are not heard. The huge gap between the political elites and young Tunisians is getting 
wider in a way that mutual understanding has become more difficult. Consequently, these young 
Tunisians feel that it is a waste of time and effort to engage in such organizations as this won’t 
bring about any change. Second, the low civic participation in Tunisia reflects the 
underrepresentation of youth in the National Constituent Assembly (World Bank Report, 2014). In 
fact, 4% of the 2016 members in NCA are under 30, which testifies to the necessity of changing 
the representative system in a way that guarantees a comprehensive representation of Youth in all 




Recruitment Strategies  
In order to recruit new members, operatives or supporters, violent extremist groups use a number 
of tools and techniques. While some recruitment tools are quite costless, others require substantial 
funding and investment, including the use of a network of other groups or individuals or the 
maintenance of some infrastructure. In the Tunisian context, and according to the authorities’ 
reports, recruitment often takes place in religious institutions such as the mosques. Recruitment 
may also occur online or through particular social contacts as these techniques provide an easy and 
costless access to lower socio-economic areas and even to prisons. Recruitment in Tunisia may 
also occur in areas where violent extremist groups already enjoy some territorial control, such as 
the Tunisian-Algerian borders.  
Direct Recruitment  
Direct recruitment occurs when a direct personal contact between the recruiter and the individual 
takes place. Through direct recruitment, recruiters generally select particular geographical areas 
where it is quite easy to find sympathizers or supporters of a particular violent group. The selection 
of these new members is not random. It is made according to the group’s needs, ranging from 
militants to professionals such as doctors and engineers. Active recruitment requires substantive 
funding. The extremist violent group assigns one or a number of individuals to select and recruit 
new members. In order to effectively fulfil such a task, these individuals need a source of funding 
to sustain their living expenses and provide the necessary environment for the recruitment. This 
ranges from setting up meeting places, providing fake documents, booking flights tickets and 
training. All these expenses and others are generally met by the recruiter. Other forms of funding 
may come from donations from followers and sympathizers of the extremist group. 
Indirect Recruitment  
Indirect recruitment takes place when new individuals are recruited through indirect means, such 
as media campaigns and online communication tools. The use of social media as a tool to recruit 
new members in the extremist violent groups is common in Tunisia. According to the authorities’ 
reports, these groups heavily rely on social media channels and internet to introduce their ideology, 
disseminate their propaganda and work on new recruitments. This strategy allows these groups to 
spread their ideas at a low cost and identify potential new members who are psychologically and 
even financially ready to join these groups.  
While social media channels are the easiest and the largest windows for indirect recruitment of new 
individuals, violent extremist groups in Tunisia have largely used traditional strategies including 
printing leaflets, holding meetings and broadcasting programs targeting young people who are 
willing to join these groups. One good example of this is the ISIS-monthly magazine, Dabiq, 
available since 2014 and inspired by Al-Qaeda’s magazines. In Tunisia, recruitment using 
traditional strategies was quite easy especially in 2012 and 2013. Violent extremist groups had an 
easy access to young Tunisians through leaflets and public meetings. However, since 2014, 
traditional recruitment has gradually become more complex as tightened security measures have 
significantly increased. Accordingly, indirect recruitment was limited to online communication 
tools.  
Although access to the internet, including the creation of websites and the use of social media 
channels such as Facebook and YouTube, is almost free, violent extremist groups, especially ISIS, 
create high-quality content as it employs a number of media experts and high-tech equipment. In 
view of the quality of the content and the frequency of distribution, it is clear that these violent 
groups use a large number of moderators and bloggers who are experts in the field.  
Counter Violent Extremism Strategies  
Tunisia’s armed forces have been engaged in a low- intensity war against violent terrorist groups 
operating especially in the Tunisia-Algerian borders. The Tunisian military has been continuously 
launching raids against terrorist cells hiding in Chaambi Mountains in the south of Tunisia. For 
instance, the Tunisian security forces along with the army launched a raid in February 2014 that 
ended up with killing seven militants belonging Ansar al-Sharia, including the suspect of Chokri 
Belaid’s murder. Two days later, the Tunisian security forces launched another raid that led to the 
arrest of four militants, including the suspect of Mohamed Brahmi’s murder. In October 2014, the 
Tunisian forces killed six militants, including one woman, in the Northern suburbs of the capital 
Tunis. Since 2014, a significant number of Ansar al-Sharia fighters were killed and hundreds were 
arrested. Such relative success is the corollary of various factors, including practical security 
reforms implemented by the different governments, new equipment for both the army and security 
forces and a public opinion that supported the security forces’ operations and openly rejected any 
form of violence and extremism.   
Counter violent extremism strategies have not been limited to military operations. Instead, the 
Tunisian authorities used an economic approach to counterterrorism, especially in the southern 
borders with Libya. Since the attacks on the town of Ben Guerden in 2016, the Tunisian 
governments have continuously strived to increase employment opportunities by creating a free 
trade zone in Ben Guerden. This free trade zone aims at reducing the illegal economic activities in 
the borders as well as increasing the economic opportunities for the youth of the region. Along 
similar lines, the governments also adopted a security approach in the region by increasing the 
number of security forces in the region to fight terrorism and illegal smuggling.  
Since 2016, deradicalization has also been adopted by the Tunisian governments through the use 
of preventive measures that target extreme violent political and religious ideologies to embrace 
more moderate views. In 2015, the Ministry of Religious Affairs launched a new campaign 
targeting the Tunisian youth on social media. “We are Islam” campaign aimed at sensitizing young 
people of the dramatic consequences of joining violent extremist groups and encouraging them to 
adopt moderate religious views that help them easily and smoothly integrate within their socio-
cultural environment. Accordingly, the Ministry designed a campaign with a diverse content, 
including a website that records religious conferences and seminars along with government’s 
advertisements on social media and TV channels. The Ministry of Religious Affairs also decided 
to recruit new Imams and religious instructors in the mosques to spread an anti-violent discourse 
that discourages youth from joining extremist groups abroad and help them acquire an in-depth 
knowledge about Islam. The Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research has also 
contributed to the deradicalization strategy. In fact, in 2017, the ministry allocated around $1 
million to study the roots of radicalization and violent extremism among young Tunisians. The 
funding was secured thanks to a partnership between a number of research centres in Tunisia and 
foreign institutions including the U.S Department of State. The deradicalization strategy also 
involved the young Tunisians who are in prisons. The Tunisian Directorate General of Prisons and 
Rehabilitation established new centres. The importance of these centres is two-fold:  First, they 
help reintegrate those who are coming back home from Syria and Libya. Second, they help the 
Tunisian authorities closely examine these young Tunisians to design new policies that may 
effectively counter violent extremism.  
As far as legislation is concerned, the Tunisian parliament signed and ratified a new anti-terrorist 
law, published on the 7th of August 2015 in the official journal of the Tunisian Republic. The prime 
aim of the law was to deal with the Tunisian militants who are coming back home from the hot 
spots. According to this law, any Tunisian militant who has been involved in a violent extremist 
group will be arrested and judged. The law was initiated by Habib Essid’s government in an attempt 
to calm fears over the homecoming of thousands of Tunisian jihadists. Nevertheless, the law was 
harshly criticized by the Tunisian civil society and a number of international non-governmental 
organizations, as it allows all kinds of abuses in the name of security reforms. In 2017, Amnesty 
International published a report in which it described the anti-terrorist law as an arbitrary, 
discriminatory and repressive law that will allow security forces to rely on brutal tactics including 
torture, restrictions on the travel of suspects and harassment of militants’ family members. Mr. Ben 
Emmerson, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human 
rights and fundamental freedoms, shared his concerns with regard to prolonged periods of detention 
and the use of counter- terrorist laws against journalists. He also recommended further efforts to 
be implemented in order to accelerate the judicial proceedings including providing additional 
human resources to the Anti-Terrorist Judiciary Pole as well as simplifying the complexities of the 
Tunisian judiciary system.  
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